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Abstract Nowadays, it is very popular to make friends,
share photos and exchange news throughout social net-
works. Social networks widely expand the area of peo-
ple’s social connections and make communication much
smoother than ever before. In a social network, there
are many social groups established based on common
interests among persons, such as learning group, family
group, reading group, etc. People often describe their
profiles when registering as a user in a social network.
Then social networks can organize these users into groups
of friends according to their profiles. However, an im-
portant issue must be considered, namely, many users’
sensitive profiles could have been leaked out during this
process. Therefore, it is reasonable to design a privacy
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preserving friends finding protocol in social network.
Toward this goal, we design a fuzzy interest matching
protocol based on private set intersection. Concretely,
two candidate users can first organize their profiles into
sets, then use Bloom filters to generate new data struc-
tures and finally find the intersection sets to decide
whether being friends or not in the social network. The
protocol is shown to be secure in the malicious model
and can be useful for practical purposes.
1 Introduction
Social network is a multi-function platform for mem-
bers to communicate with each other conveniently and
establish social relationship. There exist many kinds
of social network services, such as instant messaging,
photo sharing, news discussion, instant financial pay-
ing, etc. At present, Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, QQ,
WeChat and many other social network platforms has
all become extremely popular around the world. It is
estimated that the record number of sharing contents
everyday on Facebook is as high as 4 billion and that
number for twitter is about 340 million. Furthermore,
due to the fast development of mobile social networks,
people could publish information about videos, photos,
articles and so on at any time and any place, which
makes communication and sharing with friends very
convenient.
Usually social network users tend to build their on-
line social network from real social friends, such as rela-
tives, colleagues, classmates etc. [5,16]. But this might
not fully satisfy the requirements of online communica-
tion. For example, football fans would like to pay at-
tention to news and techniques around football. Thus
they would have more preferences on setting up a social
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group on discussing about football. Therefore, social
networks should provide a platform for people to com-
municate and add someone as friends according to their
will on purely on personal knowledge or personal rela-
tions. However, some sensitive information, such as per-
sonal attributes and locations, could be abused, which
can contribute to serious concerns. In order to preserve
the privacy of information sharing, we design a scenario
and adapt some measures to deal with the related se-
curity problems.
Let us consider the following scenario which can be
seen in Fig. 1: Alice and Bob are strangers in a so-
cial network. Alice finds that Bob’s interests are sim-
ilar with her interests, so she wants to be a friend to
Bob. However, Alice wouldn’t like to leak her privacy to
other people when facing strangers. Therefore, an ac-
cess for them to enable interaction in the social network
is needed.
Let us consider additionally the following scenario:
Alice and Bob are strangers in a social network. Alice
finds that Bob’s interests are similar with himself, so
she wants to be a friend to Bob. In some cases, Alice
wouldn’t like to leak his privacy to other people when
facing strangers. So, a secure access for them to interact
is a basic requirement.
A way to deal with this problem can be as follows:
actually, both parties can’t interact with each other di-
rectly in social networks. They need to get the help
of SNSP (social network service provider) to transmit
information. Alice and Bob can’t communicate inde-
pendently, while both of them can communicate with
SNSP, according to the following steps.
1. Assume that Alice wants to inquire friendship to
someone who has common interests with her and
makes a request to SNSP.
2. When SNSP obtains the request of Alice, it will se-
lect some users in accordance with the conditions
and make a set of interest for Alice. If Alice likes
reading novels, watching cartoons and seeing movies,
the set will be VAlice = {novel, cartoon,movie}.
Similarly, the interest set for Bob will be VBob =
{basketball,
novel, program}.
3. Alice and Bob will take a fuzzy matching, each with
its own set. If succeed, they will be friends. If not,
their friendship in the social network would not be
established.
1.1 Paper’s Contribution
In this paper, we present a variant of Private Set In-
tersection (PSI) and design a secure protocol of fuzzy
interest matching for friends finding in social networks.
This variant is shown secure in the malicious model,
based on Bloom filter and homomorphic encryption.
We then present an outsourced computation scheme in
which the client outsources his complex computation
tasks to a trusted powerful service provider P . This is
each time more commonplace in the cloud computing
where service providers can provide large number of re-
sources and powerful computation ability [21,27,28,26,
6].
Compared with the state of the art, our protocol has
some advantages that are drawn by evaluating its se-
curity and performance. Our protocol has the following
properties:
• Being more secure
– The PSI variant and the outsourced scheme are
provably secure in the malicious model. There-
fore, our protocols based on PSI are against ma-
licious adversary. The previous works presenting
secure schemes in the malicious model are [7,9,
13,14,15,17,20].
– Our scheme is secure in the standard model (with-
out random oracles). The only cryptographic as-
sumption is the decisional composite residuosity.
– Our scheme is client set-size independent. Al-
though we set the upper bound on the size of
the client set, this is not related to client set-size.
We check the server for the client set elements to
get the intersection. Therefore, the client doesn’t
need to meet the requirements of false positive.
• Being more efficient
– The PSI variant has linear complexity O(m),
where m denotes the size of Bloom filter. The
outsourced protocol is very efficient and the only
expensive cost is hash function, which can achieve
linear complexity O(n), where n represents the
number of set elements. Whereas, previous pro-
tocols with linear complexityO(v+w) [10], where
v and w also represent the number of elements
in the set.
– We encrypted Bloom filters by Paillier cryptosys-
tem with additive homomorphic property. The
server only performs modular multiplication rather
than expensive operations, such as modular ex-
ponentiations. In order to reduce the computa-
tion task of the client, we outsource complex
computation load to the service provider P .
– We used Bloom filter that is based on hash func-
tion to store elements of both sides. Note that
the hash functions are not full domain hash func-
tions.
• Supporting homomorphic computation
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Fig. 1: Interest matching for two social network users
Homomorphic encryption allows specific types of
computations to be carried out on ciphertexts and
generates an encrypted result. In this paper, we uti-
lize an additive homomorphic public key cryptosystem-
Paillier encryption. What the server operates are ci-
phertexts, which can guarantee the security of the
client. Practically, we want the server to perform
additive operation for plaintexts, but it couldn’t be
likely to execute on plaintexts. To achieve our goal,
the server only performs modular multiplication that
can compute what we need to get the intersection.
This is a main advantage of our protocol.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2, we refer to related work on this research
topic. Some preliminaries concepts, definitions and ter-
minology are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we present
our proposal constructed by Paillier cryptosystem and
its additive homomorphic property, where we also prove
its security and analyse its efficiency and in Section 5 we
present the protocol. Further in Section 6, we present
an outsourced computation scheme. We summarize this
paper’s contributions and give an outlook to future
work in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In Eurocrypt’04, Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas [13] firstly
presented protocols based on homomorphic encryption
and balanced hashing for both semi-honest and mali-
cious environments. Since then, there have been pro-
posed a large number of private set intersection proto-
cols. These protocols can be classified into four kinds.
1. Based on oblivious polynomial evaluation. Oblivious
polynomial evaluation is an effective way to con-
struct private set intersection. It doesn’t need to
disclose the coefficients of a polynomial. The main
idea is considering the elements set as the roots of
the polynomial. One can evaluates it on the other
party’s set elements obliviously. The protocol pre-
sented by Freedman et al.[13] is based on oblivi-
ous polynomial evaluation. Cheielewski and Hoep-
man [4] considered that the construction proposed
by Freedman is incorrect, and proved that a client
can obtain server’s elements on the condition that
they don’t have the same elements. These protocols
are used by generic zero-knowledge proofs and se-
cure in the semi-honest model and malicious model.
Dachman et al. [7] don’t use generic zero-knowledge
proofs and presented an improved construction se-
cure against malicious adversaries. Hazay and Nis-
sim [15] also put forward private set intersection
protocols based on random oracle model in secure
and malicious environments, respectively.
2. Based on oblivious pseudo-random functions. The
main idea of oblivious pseudo-random functions is
that the client can evaluate a keyed and pseudo-
random function on its put. But the key is con-
trolled by the server. The goal is to compute the
intersection on the pseudo-random functions of the
set elements. Then, the client gets the result of the
pseudo-random function obliviously. Hazay and Lin-
dell [14] presented the first protocol, Jarecki, Liu [18]
and Decristofaro [10] et al. improved these protocols
later.
3. Based on Bloom filters. In 2012, Many, Burkhart
and Dimitropoulos [23] present a secure multiplica-
tion protocol based on Bloom filters and each party
obtains an intersection. But the intersection Bloom
filter leaks out information of other parties. Ker-
schbaum [19] constructs an outsourced private set
intersection protocol using Goldwasser-Micali ho-
momorphic encryption. But the protocol has high
communication overhead. Changyu Dong et al. [12]
proposed two protocols based on the semi-honest
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and malicious model, which are much faster. Deb-
nath and Dutta [11] proposed two constructions of
PSI-CA, one is secure in the standard model and the
other is secure in the random oracle model under the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption against ma-
licious adversary. However, the ideas of their con-
struction are different with the prior work.
4. Based on blind signature. The idea of these protocols
based on blind signature is to present or aggregate
signatures set elements, hash the result of the verifi-
cation and compute the intersection on the hashes.
The advantage of using blind signatures is that the
client could obtain a signature without disclosing
it. In 2009, Camenisch and Zaverucha [3] presented
a private set intersection protocol that requires the
input set must be signed and certified by a trusted
party. De Cristofaro and Tsudik [7], presented pro-
tocols secure against semi-honest adversaries and
have linear complexity, which is the most efficient
protocol at present. Along this line, De Cristofaro
et al. [9] extended the protocols to the malicious
model.
3 Preliminaries and Notations
3.1 Fuzzy Private Matching
In Eurocrypt04, Freedman, Nissim and Pinkas first in-
troduced the private fuzzy matching problem. The prob-
lem is defined for two parties and each of them owns
a set respectively. Every set has T elements. The one
party computes the fuzzy set intersection of two sets.
If there exist at least t similar elements in the intersec-
tion, then the two set matches successfully. The process
to compute the intersection should guarantee the secu-
rity of the other party’s set and that won’t leak out any
information. At the same time, the other party won’t
learn anything about the content.
Let us suppose that the vectors of client’s set is C =
{a1, a2, · · · , aT } and the server’s set is S = {s1, s2, · · · , sT }.
When there are at least t common elements between C
and S, we denote C ≈t S.
3.2 Bloom Filters
A Bloom filter [1] is a compact data structure support-
ing for data storage and membership querying, as can
be seen Fig. 2. It is an array of m bits that can repre-
sent a set S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn) with at most n elements.
A Bloom filter couples with a set of k independent uni-
form hash functions H = (h0, h1, · · · , hk−1} such that
each hi maps elements to index numbers over the range
[0,m − 1] uniformly. We give a Create Algorithm for
client in Fig. 3. Further, we use BFs to denote a Bloom
filter that encodes the set S , and use BFs(i) to denote
the bit at index i in BFs. For example, in Fig. 2, when
initializing, all bits in the array are set to 0. To insert
an element x ∈ S into the filter, the element is hashed
using the k hash functions to get k index numbers. The
bits at all these indexes in the bit array are set to 1, set
BFs[hi(x)] = 1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k−1. To check if an element
y is in S, y is hashed by the k hash functions and all
locations y hashes are checked. If any of the bits at the
locations is 0, y is not in S, otherwise y is probably in
the set S.
However, a Bloom filter could have false positive in
practice. It is possible that y is not in the set S, but all
locations of BFS [hi(y)] are all equal to 1. A particular
bit in the Bloom filter is set to 1, the probability of
which is p = 1−(1−1/m)kn. Bose, Guo and Kranakis [2]
proved the upper bound of the false positive probability
is:
 = pk · (1 +O(k
p
√
ln(m)− k ln(p)
m
))
which is negligible in k. Given T elements added into
Bloom filter and the maximum false positive rate 2−k,
the necessary size of Bloom filter m can be set to Tk
ln2 2
.
3.3 Paillier Encryption Scheme
In this section, we briefly introduce the Paillier encryp-
tion scheme. The paillier encryption scheme [25] is a
probalistic public-key algorithm, which is composed of
key generation, encryption, and decryption as follows:
1. Key Generation: Choose two large prime numbers p
and q randomly such that
gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1
compute
n = pq, λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
where lcm stands for the least common multiple.
Select random integer g by checking the existence
of the following modular multiplicative inverse:
µ = (L(gλ(modn2)))−1(modn)
where function L is defined as L(u) = µ−1n . Note
that the notation a/b denote the quotient of a di-
vided by b. Finally, the public (encryption) key is
(n, g) and the private (decryption) key is (λ, µ).
2. Encryption: Let m be a message to be encrypted and
m ∈ Zn. Select random r where r ∈ Z∗n, compute
the ciphertext c = gm · rn(modn2).
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Create Algorithm(n, m, C, BFC)
Input: n, m, a set C
Output: a Bloom filter BFC
1   for all x ∈C
2         for i = 0 to m-1
3               BFC[i]=0
4          End for
5          for i =0 to k-1
6                 j = hash(x)
7                 if BFC [j]==0  then
8                        BFC [j]=1
9                 End if
10         End for
11  End for
Fig. 3: Create Algorithm
Paillier Security: The paillier encryption scheme was proved
semantic security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-
CPA) under the decisional composite residuosity (D-
CR) assumption. In our scheme, we mainly encrypt 0
or 1. For the same 0 or 1, choosing different random r
could be encrypted into different numbers, which ben-
efit our construction to some extent.
4 Security model
Before introducing our new protocols, we briefly dis-
cuss the security models of adversaries for two-party
protocols[24]. Security of protocols in the real model is
evaluated by comparison to an ideal model. In the ideal
model, client and server submit their input to a trusted
third party that can execute PSI protocols and returns
the final result to the client. Goldreich gives definitions
of the semi-honest model and the malicious model.
In the malicious model, a malicious adversary can
behave arbitrary feasible deviated from the specified
program. We consider the real model in which a re-
al protocol is executed. A malicious party may follow
an arbitrary feasible strategy which gets an auxiliary
input. Particularly, the malicious party may refuse to
participate or abort the execution at any point in time,
which is different from the semi-honest party. But we
can simulate the same behavior of every adversary in
the ideal model.
5 Fuzzy matching protocol based on PSI
We exploit the properties of Paillier encryption to con-
struct our scheme, which includes five stages. Our fuzzy
matching protocol based on PSI is introduced in the
following. The similar elements between two sets are
obtained by PSI protocol and then the result of fuzzy
matching would be achieved.
5.1 Proposed Scheme Based on the Malicious Model
1. Encryption: First, the client will generate private key
and public key of Paillier encryption scheme. The
client encrypts BFC with public key.
E(BFC) = [E(BFC(0)), · · · , E(BFC(m− 1))]
Fig. 3: Create Algorithm
3. Decryption: Let c be the ciphertext to decrypt, where
c ∈ Z∗n2 . Compute the plaintext messages as m =
L(cλ(modn2)) · µ mod n.
Homomorphic Properties: Given two ciphertexts E(m1,
PK) = gm1rn1 (modn
2) an E(m2, PK) = g
m2rn1 (mod
n2), where r1 and r2 are randomly chosen from Z
∗
n, we
have
E(m1, pk) · E(m2, pk)
= (gm1rn1 )(g
m2rn2 )(modn
2) = gm1+m2(r1r2)
n(modn2)
= E(m1 +m2, pk)
Paillier Security: The Paillier enc yption scheme was
proved semantic s e against ch sen-plaint xt attack
(IND-CPA) under the decisional composite residuosity
(DCR) assumption. In our scheme, we mainly encrypt
using 0 or 1. For the same 0 or 1, choosing iffere t
random r could be encrypted into different numbers,
which benefit our construction to some extent.
4 Security model
Before introducing our new protocols, we briefly dis-
cuss the security models of adversaries for two-party
protocols [24]. Security of protocols in the real model is
evaluated by comparison to an ideal model. In the ideal
model, client and server submit their input to a trusted
third party that can execute PSI protocols and returns
t e final result to the client. Goldreich gives definitions
of the semi-honest model and the malicious model.
In the malicious model, a malicious adversary can
behave arbitrary feasible deviated from the specified
program. We consider the real model in which a real
protocol is executed. A malicious party may follow an
arbitrary feasible strategy which gets an auxiliary in-
put. Particularly, the malicious party may refuse to
participate or abort the executio at any point in time,
whi is different from the semi-honest party. But we
can simulate the same behaviour of every adversary in
the ideal model.
5 Fuzzy Matching rotocol based on PSI
We exploit the properties of Paillier encryption to con-
struct our scheme, which includes five stages. Our fuzzy
matching protocol based on PSI is introduced in the
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following. The similar elements between two sets are
obtained by PSI protocol and then the result of fuzzy
matching would be achieved.
5.1 Proposed Scheme Based on the Malicious Model
1. Encryption: First, the client will generate private key
and public key of Paillier encryption scheme. The
client encrypts BFC with public key.
E(BFC) = [E(BFC(0)), · · · , E(BFC(m− 1))]
The client will transfer E(BFC) to the server di-
rectly.
2. Computation: The server receives E(BFC) from client
and computes the following formulas according to
Paillier encryption’s homomorphic properties, that
is:
E(BFC) · gBFs
= E([BFC [0] +BFS [0], · · · ,
BFC [m− 1] +BFS [m− 1])
= E(BFC +BFS) = E(BFC∪S)
Therefore, we can find that the client and the server’s
two Bloom filters are added together (see Fig. 4).
Then, the server generates r = [r0, · · · , rm−1] ∈ Zmq
randomly and computes E(r(BFC∪S/2)). That is:
E(r(BFC∪S/2))
= E[(r0[BFC [0] +BFS [0]− 2], · · · ,
rm−1[BFC [m− 1] +BFS [m− 1]− 2])]
= E[BFC∪S ] · E(−2)r
= E(BFC) · gBFS · E(−2)r
Next, the server will transfer E(r(BFC∪S/2)) to the
client. In the real execution, the server could com-
pute the final result of E(r(BFC∪S/2)) rather than
store the intermediate results, such as E(BFC∪S) or
E(BFC) · gBFs .
3. Recover: From the outcome of E(r(BFC∪S/2)), the
client will decrypt E(r(BFC∪S/2)) with private keys.
The client can calculate the value of r(BFC [i] +
BFS [i]−2). If r(BFC [i]+BFS [i]−2) equals 0, we can
know BFC [i] = BFS [i] = 1 and then BFC∪S [i] = 1.
Otherwise BFC [i] 6= BFS [i] and then BFC∪S [i] = 0.
4. Check: For any x ∈ C, if the locations in BFC∪S
mapped by hash(x) are all 1, then x ∈ C ∪S as can
be seen from Alg. 1.
In our algorithm, we can compute the elements of
C ∪ S and thus get the number of similar elements
of C and S. We record this number as t.
Algorithm 1 Check Algorithm (BFC∪S , a set C and
a set C ∪ S.
Require: A bloom filter BFC∪S , a set C and a set C ∪ S.
Ensure: True if x ∈ C, false else.
1: for all x ∈ C,
2: for i = 0 to k − 1.
3: i = hash(x)
4: End For
5: If all BFC∪S [i] = 1 then
6: x ∈ C ∪ S
7: End if
8: End For
5. Match: The client computes η = tn . If η meets the
requirements of system, they would be friends. Else,
the client would reject the request of the server.
5.2 Analysis of Our Scheme
Correctness. As we know, all location of Bloom filters are
0 or 1. The Fig. 4 shows the details of two Bloom filters
added together and subtracted by 2. If we don’t con-
sider the encryption of them, both Bloom filters added
together will be BFC∪S that each location is 0, 1 and
2. When the client receives E(r(BFC∪S/2)) from the
server, what we encrypt is -1, 0 and -2. Let’s consider
BF [i]+BF [i]−2, namely E(r(BFC [i]+BFS [i]−2)) =
E(r · 0) = E(0). We can find that the outcome de-
crypted by the client is 0, the result will be BFC [i] =
BFS [i] = 1. Therefore, the intersection of both Bloom
filters BFC∪S can be achieved and the client executes
the Check Algorithm to compute the similar elements
with server.
Security proof. The security of our scheme is based
on the security of private set intersection protocol. In
order to prove the security of our scheme, we only need
to prove the security of PSI protocol. We give security
proof by comparison between the real model and an
ideal model. The real model is the execution of our PSI
protocol. The ideal model is the execution of the set
intersection protocol implemented by a trusted server.
Furthermore, the client and the server may behave arbi-
trarily during protocol execution except protocol abor-
tion.
Theorem 1 If the decisional composite residuosity (DCR)
assumption holds, then the protocol PSI implements pri-
vate set intersection in the malicious model securely.
Proof 1. Confidentiality of the client: All inputs of the
client are encrypted by Paillier encryption. Although
what we encrypt is 0 or 1, the results of encryption
are different numbers. In other words, the server
can’t identify the distribution of 0s and 1s. Besides,
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Fig. 4: Two Bloom filters added together and subtracted by 2.
security in PSI is based on IND-CPA secure encryp-
tion that can guarantee the security of client.
2. Confidentiality of the server: The server only com-
putes the final results according to the algorithm
and can’t decrypt it to get BFC without private
keys. To prove the security of our scheme against
malicious adversary, it must be shown that for any
possible client (server) behaviour in the real model,
there is an input that the client (server) provides to
the Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the ideal model,
such that his view in the real protocol is efficiently
distinguishable from his view in the ideal model.
Therefore, we give two constructions of simulator
SIMS and SIMC from a malicious real world. We
first give the simulator SIMS .
(a) Constructions of a simulator SIMS from a ma-
licious real world server S′:
i. The simulator SIMS encodes server’s all el-
ements by BFS .
ii. The simulator SIMS receives E(BFC) from
the client and simulates E(r(BFC∪S/2)).
iii. The simulator SIMS now plays the role of
the ideal server interacting with the ideal
client.
Since Paillier encryption scheme is IND-CPA se-
cure under the decisional composite residuosity
(DCR) assumption, the view of the malicious
server S′ in the simulation by SIMS and in the
real protocol are indistinguishable.
(b) Constructions of a simulator SIMC from a ma-
licious real world client C ′:
i. The simulator SIMC encodes the client’s all
elements by BFC and receives the encrypted
results E(BFC) from malicious client C
′.
ii. The simulator SIMC receives the input
E(r(BFC∪S/2)) from the ideal server and
records it.
iii. The simulator SIMC plays the role of the
ideal client and simulates r(BFC∪S/2).
Since the server can’t modify the computing re-
sults without private key in the real model, what
the client receives could be secure and confidential.
Therefore, the view of the malicious client C ′ in the
simulation by SIMC and in the real protocol is in-
distinguishable.
5.3 Complexity Analysis
The complexity of our protocol is O(m), m represents
the size of Bloom filter. We used hash function, Pail-
lier encryption and modular multiplication. We analyse
the efficiency of our protocol in terms of computation,
communication and storage.
• Computational complexity: To build BFC or BFS ,
each party needs n·k hash operations. For the client,
it needs to encrypt BFC by Paillier encryption with
pubic keys and decryptm ciphertexts. For the server,
it only needs to compute m times modular multipli-
cation.
• Memory complexity: The client needs to keep a copy
of two Bloom filters, one is BFC and the other is
BFC∪S . Meanwhile, it also needs to store m cipher-
texts. The server needs to keep a copy of one Bloom
filter and m ciphertexts.
• Communication complexity: The data transferred in
this protocol is m ciphertexts.
In the Table 1, tp , th and tm represents the com-
putational cost of one time Paillier encryption, hash
function and modular multiplication.
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Table 1: Efficiency analysis
Complexity Client Server
Computation nkth + mtp nkth + mtm
Communication m group elements m group elements
Storage 2mbit+m group elements mbit+m group elements
In order to demonstrate our scheme’s efficiency, we
evaluate its performance. The computation cost of the
proposed scheme is roughly evaluated on a personal
computer with 3.6GHz eight-core and 12GB RAM mem-
ory [22]. We currently use SHA-1 to build Bloom filters
and let N be 1024 bits to achieve 80-bits security. The
reference running time of Paillier encryption and de-
cryption can be seen in Table 2. Compared with Paillier
encryption, the computation cost of hash function and
modular multiplication can be neglected. Therefore, the
computation cost of client depends on the cost of Pail-
lier encryption. Furthermore, the computation cost de-
pends on the size of Bloom filter. Now, we let k = 80
and give different values of m and n to acquire the im-
plementation. When we compute the cost of client, we
neglect the cost of hash function and only take Paillier
encryption and decryption into consideration.
As the Table 1 and Fig. 5 show, the computation
cost of our protocol has linear complexity O(m). In
other words, the performance of our protocol depends
on the size of Bloom filter. However, it is different from
[9,10], whose complexity is O(n). Compared with the
server, the client has large computational overhead. If
this protocol is implemented in the smart phone, the
overhead of the client would be much larger. Therefore,
an outsourced fuzzy matching protocol is presented to
solve this problem.
6 Outsourced fuzzy matching protocol
In our scheme, the Paillier encryption is the most ex-
pensive operation executed by the client. In many cases,
the client maybe mobile phones, PDA and other small
devices, with limited computation resources. Outsourc-
ing computation allows resource-constrained clients to
outsource their complex computation workloads to a
server which has powerful computation ability and larger
computation resources.
6.1 Outsourced Paillier cryptosystem
Now, we give an efficient and secure outsourced algo-
rithm for Paillier cryptosystem.
• The protocol for encryption algorithm is the follow-
ing:
1. The client runs Rand algorithm (Rand can be
easily implemented in mobile devices) to gener-
ate random pairs (α, gα0 mod N
2) and (β, gβ0 mod
N2), which can be completed during the oﬄine
phase such as charging for mobile devices.
2. The client computes ggα0 , rg
β
0 ,mα+Nβ, g, g0 and
outsources them to the cloud.
3. The cloud computes P = (ggα0 )
m mod N2, Q =
(rgβ0 )
N mod N2, R = gmα+Nβ0 mod N
2 and re-
turns them to the client.
4. The client computes PQR mod N
2.
• The protocol for decryption algorithm is the follow-
ing:
1. The client runs Rand algorithm to generate ran-
dom pairs (α′, gα
′
0 mod N
2) and (β′, gβ
′
0 mod N
2).
2. Suppose the ciphertext is c, the client computes
cgα
′
0 , λα
′ − β′, g0, g and outsources them to the
cloud.
3. The cloud computes P = (cgα
′
0 )
λ mod N2, Q =
gλα
′−β′
0 mod N
2 and returns them to the client.
4. The client computes L( P
Qgβ
′
0
mod N2)µ mod N ,
which is the outcome of decryption.
6.2 Outsourced protocol
This outsourced protocol mainly aims at reducing the
cost of public key encryption for client computation.
The difference from the above protocol can be seen in
the following.
1. Outsourced encryption: The client outsources the
encryption of BFC to the cloud and returns the en-
crypted E(BFC) to the server.
2. Homomorphic computation: The server also com-
putes the result of E(r(BFC∪S/2)) and returns it
to the client.
3. Outsourced decryption: The client outsources E(r(BFC∪S/2))
to the cloud and decrypts it for the result of r(BFC∪S/2).
4. Recover, check and match: This step is the same
as the Section 5. Finally, the client obtains the in-
tersection and judges whether the two sets match
successfully or not.
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Table 2: The cost of Paillier cryptosystem
Algorithm [22] Enc Dec
PC run time 7.660ms 8.221ms
Smart phone run time 44.727ms 45.904ms
Fig. 5: The computation cost of the client.
6.3 Security Analysis
The security of this protocol depends on the security of
public key encryption.
Theorem 2 If the decisional composite residuosity (DCR)
assumption and discrete logarithm holds, then the out-
sourced protocol PSI implements private set intersection
in the malicious model.
Proof The client outsources its input to the cloud and
computes ciphertexts. The cloud receives inputs from
the client and the cloud can’t decrypt it to get the plain-
texts or key data. Therefore, the client can obtain the
true output from the cloud. In the protocol execution,
the server only receives encrypted messages. These are
all secure due to IND-CPA security of our encryption
scheme.
6.4 Performance Analysis
Throughout outsourcing, the client reduces the heavy
computation task. From Table 3, the client only needs
to do hash functions and doesn’t need to execute com-
plex public key encryption. In Section 3, the notion
of m has been explained in detail. For the security of
our constructions, m is at least of nk/ln22 ≈ 0.48nk.
Therefore, the computation time of Section 5 will be
nk(th + 0.48tp). As shown in the Table 3 and Table 4
(see also [8]), and from the Paillier encryption has much
more expensive cost than hash function even though
they are in the different platforms. From the perspec-
tive of the order of magnitude, the time cost of hash
function can be neglected. Whereas in the outsourced
protocol, the only operation is hash function and the
efficiency is improved greatly. In conclusion, this out-
sourced protocol is much more efficient than the former
version of the protocol.
We also roughly evaluate its performance using the
software Crypto++ 5.6.0 running on Windows Vista
Intel Core2 1.83GHZ 32-bit mode [8]. SHA-1 is used
for hash functions. Given a number k of different hash
functions and set size n, such that k = 80, 128, 192, 256
and n = 210, 212, 214, 216, 218, 220, the time cost of the
client is shown in the Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. It can be seen
from the figures that the computation time of the client
has the relation to the multiplication of nk and the hash
operation. When the values of n is fixed, the computa-
tion time increases linearly with the increase of k. When
the values of k is fixed, the same characteristic is pre-
sented. Therefore, this protocol is very efficient and can
support large scale data sets.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented two fuzzy matching protocols based
on Private Set Intersection protocol. They are all against
malicious adversaries in the standard model and can be
used in social network for many applications like find-
10 X. Wang et al.
Table 3: The comparison of client computation
Protocol Client Computation
Our non-outsourced proposal nkth + mtp
Our outsourced proposal nkth
Table 4: The cost for running SHA-1 one time
Windows Vista Intel Core2 1.83GHZ 32-bit mode setting Time Cycles=1/1.83GHZ
Algorithm cycles/Byte
SHA-1 11.4
Fig. 6: The cost of the client in space diagram form Fig. 7: The cost of the client in histogram form
ing friends. The overhead of the existing protocol in the
literature is very high due to the large computation of
the client. To solve this problem, we proposed an out-
sourced protocol that can reduce the computation over-
head of the client significantly. Compared with the prior
work, the securities of two protocols can be achieved in
malicious model. The efficiency of the former protocol
can achieve linear complexity and the latter protocol is
much more efficient than the former and can support
friends finding in large social networks.
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